Written by Luigi Villari
(Extracted from “Italian Foreign Policy Under Mussolini” by Luigi Villari.)
After the first World War Great Britain had begun to show signs of attempting political and economic penetration into Ethiopia. One British newspaper started a campaign to demand international action, or possibly British action alone, against Ethiopia to repress slavery which was rampant throughout the country, and it suggested that a mandate be conferred on Great Britain for the purpose. This would have meant a British protectorate, and it was for this reason that in 1923 Italy very imprudently supported Ethiopia's application for admission to the League of Nations. The application encountered opposition in many quarters, but it was eventually granted on the condition that Ethiopia should abolish slavery and respect all international engagements on the control of the arms traffic. It is needless to say that Ethiopia carried out neither of these undertakings. . . .
On August 2, 1928, Italy concluded a treaty of friendship with Ethiopia for the duration of 20 years, whereby the two governments undertook to promote reciprocal trade. It was completed by a convention for the construction of a motor road between Dessieh in Ethiopia and the Italian Eritrean port of Assab.
The frontiers between the other Italian colony of Somaliland and Ethiopia had never been delimited. An agreement had been signed on May 16, 1908, which stipulated that “all the territory belonging to the tribes toward the coast will remain under Italian rule, and all the Ogaden territory and that of the tribes toward Ogaden will remain under Ethiopia.”
The two governments undertook (Art. 5) to delimit the frontiers, but the work did not begin until December, 1910; and even then the Ethiopian delegates placed every obstacle in the way of the Italians, so that the delimitation was never completed. At this time the question was not important, for Italian Somaliland was not yet fully organized. But, in 1923, the new Governor, Count Cesare De Vecchi, proceeded to occupy the whole territory of the colony. He established a line of small military posts along the presumptive frontier to give security to the tribes under Italian protection against the frequent incursions of Ethiopian raiders, whose object was to carry off natives and enslave them.
These posts also served to protect the springs used by all the inhabitants of the area, whether they were Italian or Ethiopian subjects, to water their flocks and herds in that very dry country. One of the posts in question was Wal-Wal, around which some small forts had been erected. The raids [by Ethiopians] continued because the internal conditions of Ethiopia were chaotic, not only along the Somaliland border but also along that of Eritrea. At the same time in spite of the provisions of the 1928 treaty every obstacle was raised against the activities of Italian traders and business men in Ethiopia, and the building of the Ethiopian sector of the Dessieh-Assab road was held up.
In November, 1934, large Ethiopian forces suddenly approached the Italian frontier post at Wal-Wal—an area which had been under Italian rule for many years and to which Ethiopia had never made any claims at all. About that time, an Anglo-Ethiopian commission had been engaged in delimiting the frontier between Ethiopia and British Somaliland; and on November 23rd it, too, appeared before Wal-Wal, with an escort of 80 men of the British Somaliland Camel Corps and another much larger force of Ethiopian warriors. The British and the Ethiopian commissioners sent a joint protest to the commander of the Italian frontier area, because they were not allowed to circulate freely “in Ethiopia, in the Wal-Wal area.”
A conversation took place between the Italian commander, Captain Roberto Cimmaruta, and the British Commissioner, Lieut.-Colonel Clifford. Cimmaruta protested because the Ethiopian force was commanded by Samantar, a notorious bandit and criminal. The Ethiopians were now strengthened by fresh bands until they were five times as numerous as the Italian force of native troops at Wal-Wal. Colonel Clifford obviously encouraged the aggressive attitude of the Ethiopians, assuring their commander that the territory belonged by right to Ethiopia and giving him to understand that the claims of Ethiopia were supported by the British Government. Addis Ababa was thus led to count on Great Britain; the Negus and his advisers evidently were unfamiliar with the history of the Schleswig-Holstein dispute in 1864. Clifford, himself, however, now withdrew to Ado, so as to avoid direct responsibility for himself, while leaving his protégés to do what they wished.
On the night of December 4, 1934, the Ethiopians attacked Wal-Wal, but were beaten off after heavy fighting. As the Italians were only one-fifth as numerous as the Ethiopians, it is hardly likely that they would have been the first to attack, as the Addis Ababa Government asserted. Moreover, the only advantage which the Italians had over the Ethiopians was the possession of a couple of aeroplanes, but the attack took place at nightfall when the planes would have been of very little use. Cimmaruta, himself, not expecting the attack at that point, had moved to another post, and the native soldiers, with no Italian officer at Wal-Wal, would certainly not have taken any such initiative.
Protracted negotiations now took place at Addis Ababa, the Italian Government demanding satisfaction for the outrage and compensation for the families of the native soldiers killed in the attack. After various exchanges of notes, it was agreed that the matter should be referred to a committee of arbitration and conciliation.
In the meantime, behind the Italo-Ethiopian dispute British-Italian friction began to loom on the horizon. At first, it seemed limited to the activities of various official, semi-official and unspecified British representatives in Ethiopia, but it soon extended to the Government itself. The Cabinet was beginning to be eager, for electioneering reasons, to secure the support of the League of Nations Union. . . .
Further frontier incidents occurred in East Africa, and many raids by irregular and even regular Ethiopian forces were made on Italian colonial territory.
The Wal-Wal incident was submitted in May to the League Council, where it was finally decided that the Arbitration Committee should meet in June, first in Milan and then at Scheveningen, Holland. . . .
Ethiopia now began to concentrate ever larger forces on the frontiers of the two Italian colonies and to import quantities of war material, purchased or received gratis [free] from foreign countries. Until February, 1935 (nearly three months after Wal-Wal) the Italian East African colonies had been left almost defenseless save for small native garrisons with a few Italian officers and N.C.O.'s, whereas Ethiopia brought forward a large and well-armed standing army. It was then that Italy began to think of reinforcing its African garrisons with home troops, which required a week's voyage to reach Eritrea and a fortnight to reach Somaliland.
