Written by Michele Rallo
The last fighting of the Great War was still not over and the empires of the east and west had already been shattered. First the Russian, then the Ottoman and finally, with a series of declarations of independence, the Austro-Hungarian: on October 24, 1918, Hungary broke the dualistic bond and went its own way; on October 28 Bohemia (today's Czech Republic) declared itself independent; on the 29th it was the turn of Croatia and Slovenia; on the 30th Slovakia.
Finally, on November 1, the Austrian army abandoned the conquered Balkan territories and withdrew to the north of the Danube. That date marked, in fact, the end of hostilities on our eastern front, although the armistice would officially come into effect two days later.
Italy had not only won the war, but also achieved a great geo-strategic result: the elimination of the disquieting Austrian presence on our eastern borders and on the other side of the Adriatic. This – remember – was the main reason for Italian intervention in the conflict. Now it was time to cash in on the promises given to Italy by their dear allies; first of all, the promise according to which Italy would succeed Austria in a hegemonic role not only in the Adriatic, but in the entire Danube-Balkan area.
French Jealousies
Except France also aspired to that role, although it could not openly say so because of the commitments they had made to Italy in order to obtain Italian intervention in the conflict. Already during the war, however, Paris had made it a point to put a spoke in Italy's wheel in the Balkans. Not overtly, of course, but through the use of external agents: in Albania, in Epirus and in Montenegro, which – after Princess Elena's marriage to Vittorio Emanuele III – had in fact passed to the Italian sphere of influence.
Later, when the armistice with Bulgaria (September 29) had clearly outlined the imminent end of the war, the French had openly assumed the role of referents of Serbia. In those days – keep in mind – on the southern borders of Austria and in the Balkan peninsula the Italian and Serbian troops proceeded to occupy portions of enemy territory that were theoretically destined to their provisional administration, or to their definitive possession after the signing of the armistices and peace treaties.
It was at that point that a French maneuver was unveiled in favor of extreme Serbian expansionism; and in addition to giving them support on the political-diplomatic level, they also provided the greatest possible military support to the forces of Belgrade in their race to occupy anything that could be occupied, with the clear intention of invoking the uti possidetis principle at the peace table.
This obviously constituted a clear demonstration of hostility on the part of France (supported by England and the United States) towards Italy, whose objectives of hegemony in the Adriatic were completely incompatible with the disproportionate ambitions of Serbia. Belgrade, in fact, aimed – among other things – at acquiring the entire north-western slope of the Balkan peninsula: Istria, the Quarnaro, Slovenia, Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Montenegro, northern and central Albania; in other words, all the territories that Rome sought to either make independent (albeit keeping them in their sphere of influence), or – to a small extent – to unite to their own national territory.
Taking into account what was being prepared against Italy, the Italians in turn marched to take possession of everything possible, but on such short notice the situation only allowed for freedom of movement in the central sector, which meant Italy was only able to occupy what remained of the old Austrian domain of Lombardy-Venetia, namely Trentino-Bolzanino and Giulia-Istria.
Even this minimal result, however, enraged the American president Wilson, who – in clear agreement with his English cousins – wanted to circumscribe Italy to what he considered to be "its easily recognizable ethnographic frontier" (according to point nine of his Fourteen Points). This – in the mind of the man who made himself the arbitor of borders – would have left Italy only Trentino, transforming Alto Adige/South Tyrol and Giulia-Istria into two autonomous regions "without Italian interference". Italy, instead, had dared to advance its troops into the Alps, which – it was said – infuriated the American president, because this had happened "without my permission".
American Arrogance
At this point, the unfriendly maneuver against Italian interests seemed evident, as was the development of the same according to well-defined stages: the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Fourteen Points, and now – in perspective – the armistice. The leader of the Italian interventionists, Gabriele d'Annunzio, coining a slogan destined to become famous, roared in vain from the pages of "Corriere della Sera" on October 24, 1918: "Our victory will not be mutilated!"
But the only thing that Rome could obtain – a few days later – was that the Inter-Allied Command generically established the limits and fixtures of the areas of occupation. When this happened, everything was already practically concluded: the Austro-Hungarian Empire had dissolved, while the French and Anglo-Saxons had installed their friends to power in almost all the successor nations. Italy was permitted only the bare minimum: Trentino-Alto Adige, Giulia-Istria, a portion of Dalmatia, central Albania, and a small participation in the joint occupation of Montenegro and Upper Albania; but Italy was forbidden from participating in the occupation of Austria, Slovenia and Croatia.
On November 3, Italy and Austria concluded the armistice of Villa Giusti, an armistice which confirmed the lines just enumerated above.
At that point, the anti-Italian and pro-Serbian design was evident even for the most prudent. "With pain and indignation, I had known" – wrote General Caviglia – "the articles of the armistice of Villa Giusti, which abandoned our victory into the hands of our treacherous allies."
The Question of Fiume
One of the most controversial points of the armistice of Villa Giusti was that pertaining to the exclusion of Fiume from the Italian zone of occupation. Fiume was a port city of the Quarnaro with an Italian majority, located on the border of Istria, just beyond the armistice line imposed on Italy. To be precise – according to the Austrian census of 1910 – about half of the 50,000 inhabitants were ethnic Italians; followed by 15,000 Croats (many of them Italophiles) and 10,000 Hungarians. Now, at the end of the war, the numbers were considerably different: 33,000 Italians, 11,000 Croats, 1,300 Hungarians.
The reason for the exclusion of Fiume was traced back to the London Pact of 1915, when – it must be remembered – the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire was not foreseen, and the city of Fiume fell into Hungarian-ruled territory. Then – in anticipation of an independent or Hungarian-ruled Croatia, but certainly not a Croatia joined to Serbia – it was decided not to award the city to the Italian sphere, but instead to maintain its function as a port outlet on the Adriatic for Hungary and Croatia.
Now, however, on the eve of the armistice, the situation appeared quite different from that of 1915, with Croatia destined to be absorbed by Serbia through the artificial nascent "Yugoslav" State. Italy, therefore, asked to be allowed to include Fiume within its armistice line; it was inconceivable that an outlet port so dangerously close to the port of Trieste would be awarded to Serbia – dangerous not only for commercial considerations but also for reasons of a military nature.
But Italy's allies were adamant: Fiume was evidently considered by them to be foreign from the "easily recognizable ethnographic frontier" of Italy, and was therefore assigned to Serbian jurisdiction.
On October 29, Fiume was occupied by the Serbs and by Serbophiles of the Croatian-Slovenian National Committee. The following day, however, the representative body of the city – the National Council of Fiume – proclaimed its annexation to the Kingdom of Italy, explicitly invoking the principle of self-determination of the people and the Fourteen Points. But – as the facts later demonstrated beyond all doubt – the principle of self-determination would never be applied to the populations of the Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom: and not only was Fiume denied this right, but this right was also denied to Dalmatia, as well as to the Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Kosovars and Bosnians.
But returning to Fiume: the Serb occupiers – albeit with a certain prudence – harassed the Italian population, hoping perhaps that, according to the tried-and-true methods of ethnic cleansing, they could bully the Italians into emigrating and therefore eliminate the problem.
At the request of the National Council of Fiume, the Italian government first sent some warships (November 4) and then – faced with persistent Serbian anti-Italian attitudes – on November 17 invaded the city with a land force of 13,000 men. The Americans – in an attempt to prevent the occupation from being an exclusively Italian enterprise – also sent one of their battalions, whose presence served to give the occupation of Fiume an "international" veneer.
At that point – prudently – the Serbs were packing up and removed the disturbance. The situation now seemed to be heading towards a tiring stabilization. But suddenly the French questioned everything: with a gesture of unprecedented impropriety between allies, on November 28 they invaded the city (a unique act which never happened previously nor again in the history of European diplomacy) and on December 10 France declared Fiume as being under the sphere of occupation of the Armée d’Orient (French army).
Thus began the difficult cohabitation between Italians and French, until – seven months later – the respective troops came into open conflict. This incident was the "Fiuman Vespers", which left nine French soldiers and one Italian soldier dead. But that is a discussion for another time.
References
1 See "Il balletto dei Trattati" in "La Risacca" of February.
2 Year 1918. www.cronologia.it [2006].
3 Year 1918. Cit.
4 In reality, some of the details will be established by Marshall Foch in the following December.
5 Enrico CAVIGLIA: Il conflitto di Fiume. Garzanti editore, Milano 1948.
6 The National Comitte (Narodno Vijece) was a sort of provisional government of Croatia and Slovenia, which arose from the Serbophile elements favorable to the creation of a "Yugoslav" State, i.e. a State of the South Slavs.
7 Enrico CAVIGLIA: Il conflitto di Fiume. Cit.
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