The Treaty of Turin (1860)

Written by an unknown author

Among the various international treaties that over the years have dismembered Italy, the most well-known at the popular level is undoubtedly that of the Treaty of Osimo of 1975, both for its proximity to our own time as well as for its absurdity. Less famous but equally noteworthy was that of the Treaty of Turin of 1860, which decreed the separation of Savoy and the County of Nice from the then Kingdom of Sardinia, which soon became the Kingdom of Italy.

Historical Analysis

Leaving aside the earliest ages, of which it is sufficient to simply recall the fact that Augustus established the Var River as the western border of Italy, the city of Nice saw alternating dominations, and the fall of the Carolingian Empire allowed it to rise as a free commune. It was occupied several times by the counts of Provence, then passed under Angevin rule and, during the dispute between Louis II d'Anjou and Ladislaus, the Grimaldi di Boglio (an ancient Italian family that governed the County of Nice) convinced the city to declare itself in favor of King Ladislaus. The latter, unable to help the city, granted it the freedom of choosing any lord to rule over it who was not the Duke of Anjou. Thus Nice, on September 28, 1388, expressed its desire to become part of the Kingdom of Sardinia under Amedeo VII of Savoy through the Dedication of Saint-Pons. The act of dedication, which above all was an anti-French function, included the promise that the County would never be sold by Savoy to anyone else. Three years later Nice paid solemn tribute to Amadeo VII, recognizing him as their only sovereign, and the annexation was ratified in 1402, accompanied by the Angevin renunciation and in 1419 by imperial recognition. From that moment onwards Nice followed the alternate fortunes of the House of Savoy, being occupied several times but always returning in the end to the bosom of Savoy. One of the most famous episodes was the Franco-Turkish siege of 1543, when the citizens valiantly defended their city by taking refuge in the castle (which remained unconquered) while the besiegers sacked the conquered town. Caterina Segurana is the most famous heroine of this affair and, even today, is a symbol of the city of Nice, representing in the imagination of the city a brave Nizzarda who opposed the French and was hanged by the occupying troops at Porta Paroliera.

Notwithstanding alternating events, such as the French domination between 1796 and the Congress of Vienna (1814-15), Nice always remained linked to the House of Savoy, which guaranteed prosperity and development. Nice thus manifested itself as an Italian city: Italian was its official language since February 12, 1561, when Emanuele Filiberto replaced Latin with Italian, and the dialects of the city and the County had peculiar and exclusively local characteristics. Indeed the Nissart or Nizzardo dialect, whose base is Ligurian, is affected by considerable influences from Piedmontese and Occitan dialects, just as the syntactic and grammatical constructions are influenced by Italian. It is therefore clear that this was certainly not a French dialect, nor were the other dialects spoken in the County: those of Val Roia, Breglio, Fontano and Saorgio (Liguria), as well as those of Mentone, Roccabruna and Monaco were certainly not French. For the region of Savoy the question was different, and Emanuele Filiberto's decision to choose French as an official language there demonstrates the predominance of that language, which is contrary to what was established for the County of Nice. It is fair to remember, however, that Savoy was inhabited by a population of Provencal origin, which did not at all feel French, and was naturally linked to the reigning House of Savoy, who originated in the region.

A particular linguistic detail to note is certainly the fact that in Nice the dialect almost became extinct after 1539, during the French occupation, following the Ordinance of Villers-Cotterets, which imposed the exclusive use of the French language, a sin that the French would continue to commit, as we shall see, unlike the House of Savoy, who never forbade the Nissart dialect despite Italian being the official language. Until 1860 the Italian language was therefore the language of schools and the literate classes, among which we should remember Giuseppe Andrè (editor of “Il diritto di Nizza”, “La Voce di Nizza” and “Il Pensiero di Nizza” and author of several works including “Nizza negli ultimi quattro anni”, a testimony of his experience in the Nizzard Vespers), Enrico Sappia (globetrotter and fighter for many causes, he participated in the defense of the Roman Republic and in the Nizzard Vespers and was the author of “Nizza contemporanea” printed in London in 1871) and Francesco Barberis (author of “L’addio a Nizza” in 1860 and “Nizza italiana, raccolta di varie poesie italiane e nizzarde” published in exile in Florence in 1871).

Nice therefore appears as a city whose history, language and culture is extremely linked to Italy. How then was the shameful cession ratified by the sneaky Treaty of Turin and sanctioned by the farcical plebiscite? As we know, in 1858 Italy was divided into different kingdoms and duchies. Cavour's dream of national unity (a federalist vision), and the will of Napoleon III to redeem France's humiliation at the Congress of Vienna and to maintain control over the Italian peninsula by promoting its independence (but not Italian unification, which would have hindered this project) found conciliation in the Plombières Agreement of July 21, 1858. The meeting, preceded by various other meetings between the various messengers of the two States, resulted in a verbal agreement between the two aforementioned figures, who had addressed various issues in their discussion. Napoleon III undertook to support with all his might the Kingdom of Sardinia in a war against Austria, provided that the war did not take place in the name a revolutionary cause, in other words only in the case of an apparently defensive war, so as to be better justified in the face of national and European public opinion. The point that interested the French emperor was to drive his Austrian rivals out of the peninsula and reorganize Italy in a way favorable to him, which had been dealt with in the Pombières Agreement in much the same way:

The Kingdom of Sardinia, the Po Valley up to the Isonzo and Papal Romagna was to be under the leadership of Vittorio Emanuele II (Upper Kingdom); the Papal States (excluding Rome and its surroundings) and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany (Central Kingdom) was to be under the leadership of the Duchess of Parma Louise Marie of Bourbon (in the event that the austrophile Leopoldo II of Tuscany fled to Austria); Rome and its surroundings was to be under the control of the Pope; the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Lower Kingdom) was to remain under the sovereign of the time, Ferdinand II. This project, organized along federalist lines similar to those of the German Confederation, provided for the honorary presidency of the Pope.

In exchange for aid in the war against Austria, Napoleon III asked for Savoy and the County of Nice. Cavour proved to be compliant towards the former, by virtue of the principle of nationality that brought her closer to France than to Italy, despite being the cradle of the royal house that was to lead the Kingdom of Upper Italy; but in regards to Nice the question was different, because the same principle of nationality, which might make the cession of Savoy “understandable" and upon which the plan to unify Italy was based, should have prevented the cession of a land so closely linked to Piedmont for centuries by geography, history, language, culture and above all will, with an equally long tradition of resistance to French expansionist pressures.

The question was not precisely defined; in the following months the leaders preferred instead to concentrate on military operations and on the game of European alliances that would guarantee the neutrality/assent of some key States (Great Britain, Prussia and Russia). There was much resistance especially within France, which did not look favorably upon a commitment to the Kingdom of Sardinia against Austria, since it was favored by England against Russia in the Balkans, and there were fears also that Cavour was aiming at Rome and the Papal States which were under French protection. To seal the future alliance, Napoleon III proposed a further agreement to arrange a marriage between his cousin, the old and dissolute Gerolamo Bonaparte, and the fifteen-year-old Maria Clotilde di Savoia, daughter of Vittorio Emanuele II, who sacrificed herself as an authentic silent heroine of the Italian Risorgimento. The Plombières Agreement found fulfillment in the stipulation of the Sardo-French Alliance signed between 26th and 29th of January 1859. The diplomatic document included: a Treaty proclaiming an offensive and defensive alliance, a Military Agreement and a Financial Agreement. In summary:

Treaty of Alliance

• Article 1 provided that in the case of an act of aggression by Austria against the Kingdom of Sardinia, an offensive and defensive alliance would be stipulated between the Emperor of the French and the King of Sardinia.
• Article 2 outlined the purpose of the Alliance: to free Italy from Austrian occupation and to satisfy the wishes of the population to constitute, in the case of victory, a Kingdom of Upper Italy under the leadership of the House of Savoy.
• Article 3 affirmed that in the name of the same principle mentioned above, the Duchy of Savoy and the County of Nice would be “reunited” to France.
• Article 4 assured respect for the sovereignty of the Pope in the interest of the Catholic religion.
• Article 5 provided that the expenses of the war would be borne entirely by the Kingdom of Upper Italy.
• Article 6 concluded that both Parties should be consulted before undertaking any negotiations for the cessation of hostilities.

Military Agreement

• Article 1 stipulated that the military forces would number 300,000 men (2/3 French, 1/3 Sardinian) and that a fleet in the Adriatic would support the ground operations.
• Article 2 placed the occupied provinces in a state of siege and under the direct control of the House of Savoy.
• Article 3 elected Napoleon III commander in chief of the army.
• Article 4 required the recruitment of experienced Sardinian soldiers to present a prepared army.
• Article 5 established regulations for the supply of French troops on Italian soil.
• Article 6 named Genoa as a place of deposit and supply for the French army.
• Article 7 assessed the requisitions and compensation for the French army's procurement on the basis of French accounting forms.

Financial Agreement

• Article 1 established that all war expenses in Italy would be reimbursed to France by means of annual payments equal to 10% of all income received by the Kingdom of Upper Italy.
• Article 2 regulated the issuing of bonds by the Sardinian authorities to pay for French military supplies to the Sardinian army.
• Article 3 equally divided the profits forfeited by the taxes of the occupied provinces.
• Article 4 established a mixed commission for the settlement of war debts.

The signature was backdated to the 12th and 16th of December 1858, so as not to present the Alliance so close in time to the dynastic marriage that occurred on January 30th. At the signing of the Agreement Cavour was repeatedly interrogated by a parliamentary committee about the details of the agreement, lying when asked if any negotiations had been started concerning Nice and Savoy. The reality was very different and already quite clear (at least according to the French): Nice and Savoy were to be relinquished in exchange for aid in the conquest of Milan, Venice and Bologna.

Cavour's dream of national unity paradoxically depended on Vienna, since the alliance would have materialized only in the event of a Habsburg offensive. Piedmontese provocations, together with a massive rearmament (in violation of the peace agreement of 1849), led to the Austrian ultimatum, which was rejected, triggering the Second Italian War of Independence. Everyone knows the story: in just over a month the Franco-Piedmontese forces managed to free Lombardy, which on June 9, 1959, confirming the plebiscite of 1848, becomes part of the Kingdom of Sardinia. Later the islands of Lussino and Cherso in the Quarnaro, whose populations welcomed the Franco-Sardinian troops while waving the French and Italian tricolors, were liberated while Garibaldi occupied Como, Bergamo and Brescia with his Hunters of the Alps. The advance continued towards the Quadrilateral fortresses where the Austrians retreated and received reinforcements, attracting the Franco-Piedmontese army to the same theater area of the victorious operation by General Radetzky 11 years earlier. Here the victorious battles of Solferino and San Martino took place on June 24, 1859 (preceded by a great French offensive in Magenta), with which the Italians and the French drove the Austrians beyond the Mincio river, giving the impression of a rapid conquest also of Venetia.

Napoleon III however, to avoid extending the war to Central Europe, given the threats of Prussian intervention, signed a truce with the Austrians (in violation of the treaty which required consultation before entering into peace negotiations). He met with Franz Joseph at Villafranca a few days later, where the so-called Armistice of Villafranca was signed. The armistice laid the foundations for peace negotiations, during which Napoleon III, however, proposed to treat the cession of Lombardy alone, again failing to honor the Plombières Agreement. Vittorio Emanuele II accepted it, enraging Cavour, who strongly protested to both the French emperor and to his sovereign, encouraging him to continue the war on his own to free the Italians from the Austrian yoke. His requests remained unheeded, and Austria and France sought to remove him from the European stage as he was see as a danger to the peace that was being entered into.

The armistice in its final conditions provided that:

• Napoleon III and Franz Joseph would favor the creation of an Italian Confederation under papal leadership (a significant damage to the image of the House of Savoy according to Cavour, as the pope would be “allied” with the Austrians who oppressed the Italians).
• Austria would cede Lombardy to France (who would then turn it over to the Kingdom of Sardinia) excluding the strongholds of Mantua and Peschiera.
• Venetia would remain under Austria but would be part of the Italian Confederation.
• The Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena (pro-Austrians) would have their domains returned to them.
• The French and Austrian emperors would call for social and political reforms in the Papal States.

The Treaty was formalized with the Peace of Zurich in November 1859, but in fact it was not respected, except for the parts concerning Lombardy. Indeed the populations of central Italy had immediately overthrown their sovereigns, expressing their desire to become part of the Kingdom of Sardinia. They had already recruited a large army, joined to the Tuscan revolutionary army, led by Piedmontese officers. It was therefore impossible to create the Italian Confederation and implement reforms in the Papal States. The Plombières Agreement, although not fully realized, had in any case led to a war of liberation that had militarily and politically sanctioned the greatest Austrian defeat on Italian soil. However, Napoleon III had failed to honor the agreement which provided for the liberation of all of Upper Italy, and the minor territorial conquests achieved by the House of Savoy left room for an argument that they were no longer required to give up Nice and Savoy.

After the initial controversies and despair, Cavour himself realized the favorable conditions of the situation. To resolve the stalemate, France proposed the annexation of the Duchies of Parma and Modena to Piedmont, Savoyard control over Papal Romagna, and a separate kingdom in Tuscany under the leadership of an exponent of the House of Savoy in exchange for the cession of Nice and Savoy. In the case of a refusal Piedmont would have to fare alone against Austria, but Cavour, sensing the tide, agreed to hold plebiscites for the annexation of Parma, Modena and Romagna (Marche and Umbria instead were taken by papal troops during famous the “Massacre of Perugia” on June 20, 1859), but defied France in regards to Tuscany. France, which did not look favorably upon a great territorial expansion of the Kingdom of Sardinia, since it would have compromised their own desire to control the peninsula, reacted vehemently to the annexation of Tuscany, which took place on March 12, 1860 through a plebiscite, and strongly urged the cession of Nice and Savoy. On March 24, 1860, the notorious Treaty of Turin was signed, which sanctioned the cession of Nice and Savoy to France.

The decision was made, but it was decided to give a formal tone to the event by organizing a plebiscite with which the population could “express” their desire to join or not to join France. Since the Treaty was already signed and conceived by everyone as a territorial compensation to compensate Napoleon III for the aid given in the Second Italian War of Independence, it is clear that the result would be obvious. The Treaty was announced on March 30th, and on April 1st King Vittorio Emanuele II affirmed in a proclamation that, although he regretted having to part ways with provinces that had long been part of the kingdom, he considered that the territorial changes which had occurred in Italy justified the French request for Nice and Savoy. It was a circumlocution designed to sweeten the bitter pill of separation from one million Savoyard citizens and two of the oldest lands belonging to the Savoy dynasty.

The plebiscite was held on April 15th/16th in the County of Nice, and on the 22nd/23rd of the same month in Savoy. The procedures made the plebiscite assume the characteristics of a farce, carried out under French military occupation and with infiltrations, pressures and frauds to sway the result of the votes in the direction desired by the French authorities. Many people who were of Savoyard origin but who were residing in France were admitted to the vote in Savoy; the vote was not made secret; in some towns (79 out of a total of 89 in the County of Nice) there was not even a single vote against the annexation; and in other towns there were even more favorable votes than the number of those entitled to vote. The overwhelmingly favorable percentages were also affected by the absence of many Nice citizens who immediately fled to Italy, and upon their return they were blocked at the border to prevent them from voting. Also decisive in this charade were the many French residents of the French Empire who were led on site to vote in France's favor. In the city of Nice alone, in fact, according to the census of 1859, the residents numbered 44,091, of which 11,000 were registered to vote. Yet the plebiscite resulted in only 6,810 “yes” votes and 11 “no” votes regarding the annexation.

Ultimately in the County of Nice, the voters numbered 25,833 out of 30,716, with 25,743 votes in favor of the annexation, 60 against, 30 null votes and 4,883 abstentions. In Savoy the voters numbered 135,449 out of 145,449, with 130,553 favorable votes (of which 47,000 were favorable also to the “free zone”), 235 against, 71 null votes and 4,590 abstentions. The only place where it was possible to have an election free from French manipulation was on the Savoyard ships anchored in the various ports: of 119 sailors from Nice with the right to express their will independently: 114 were against the annexation, 5 in favor. Truly a dirty, dark and still today hidden history: an act of true violence disguised with democratic methods exercised over an entire people who really had no free choice in the matter. In addition to this cession, to make matters worse, the towns of Mentone and Roccabruna were also included. On May 29th and June 10th, with very few votes against it and with only a few parliamentarians and senators courageous enough to speak out against the infamous Treaty, the two branches of the Piedmontese government ratified the Treaty of Turin and officially ceded Nice and Savoy.

Analysis of the Treaty

As already mentioned, the Treaty was signed on March 24, 1860 in the then Piedmontese capital. The articles were nine in number and for the sake of proper precision will be briefly examined below:

Article 1 – The Treaty opens with the declaration of the King of Sardinia in which he consents to the “reunion” of Savoy and the County of Nice with France, and to the renunciation by which he and all his descendants and successors renounce any right over these territories. The “reunion”, it is specified, will take into account the will of the people, upon whose desire the sovereigns will agree as soon as possible. As explained a few lines above, the rigged referendum resulted in a true farce passed off as a democratic consultation.

Article 2 – The second article goes on to examine the “neutralized” parts of Savoy, created by the Treaty of the Congress of Vienna, which states that they can not be transferred by the King of Sardinia except under conditions according to which he himself possesses them. As for all the others, it will be up to the French Emperor to agree with the other powers represented at the Congress of Vienna and with the Helvetic Confederation in order to give the necessary guarantees following the stipulation of the Treaty of Turin and the change of sovereignty.

Article 3 – The third article deals specifically with the delimitation of the new borders between France and the Kingdom of Sardinia, entrusted to a mixed commission which, in a spirit of fairness and taking into account the shape of the territory and the defensive needs of the two States, will draw the new frontiers.

Article 4 – The fourth article entrusts the mixed commissions with the task of resolving incidental issues to which the “reunion” will take place, namely determining the share of Nice and Savoy in the public debt of Sardinia and the fulfillment of obligations resulting from the agreements reached with the Sardinian government. The latter also agrees to finish the work undertaken for the drilling of the Frejus Rail Tunnel in the Alps near Moncenisio-Mount Cenis.

Article 5 – The civil servants and militarymen of Nice and Savoy, who will become French subjects, will see recognized the rights they had acquired within the Kingdom of Sardinia, including benefits and guarantees granted to the army.

Article 6 – The sixth article prescribes that the citizens of Savoy and the County of Nice who intend to preserve their Sardinian citizenship will have one years time, starting from the exchange of ratifications, to notify the competent authorities of their intention to retain Sardinian citizenship and move to Italy. They will also have the opportunity to maintain their property located on the territories annexed by France.

Article 7 and Article 8 – The last two articles of the Treaty dwell on their mode of entry into force and the exchange of instruments of ratification.

It seems clear that the story behind this treaty is hardly transparent, conditioned by backroom agreements which made a farce of the nominal popular consensus to which the future of the two regions of the Kingdom of Sardinia was entrusted. In the following years, however, the people of Nice would try to maintain their identity and oppose the process of denationalization carried out by the French.

Despite ten years of propaganda, repression and harassment which formed part of France's goal of conducting a true and proper cultural genocide, the people of Nice endeavored daily to oppose forced Frenchification. After the defeat at Sedan and the proclamation of the Third Republic, taking advantage of the momentary political instability and the loosening of the government's repressive grip, the population was filled with courage and the Italian sentiment of Nice once again exploded: in the elections of February 8, 1871, the pro-Italian lists received 26,534 votes out of 29,428 votes cast. Jubilant manifestations of the citizens spontaneously broke out in every corner of the city and, among the crowd which was shouting praises to Italy a flag appeared bearing the inscription “INRI”, meaning “I Nizzardi Ritorneranno Italiani” (“The people of Nice will return to being Italians”). The cries of “Down with France! Long live Italy!” and the strong electoral success was an open testimony to the repression suffered by the population in ten years of French domination and was a powerful vindication of Nice's identity and desire to belong to her true Motherland: Italy. In response to all this, the French government sent 10,000 soldiers who, after initial difficulties in dispersing the growing crowd which was shouting “Long live Italy” and “Long live Garibaldi”, stifled popular enthusiasm with violence. In the following three days, known to history as the “Nizzard Vespers”, the last remaining Italian newspapers were closed down and the majority of the irredentists were imprisoned or expelled, completing the repression that began years earlier with the Frenchification of surnames, toponyms and the elimination of the Italian language from schools and public acts.

After those three days of shining testimony of Italianism, the question of Nice disappeared from Italian politics for years, as the nascent Kingdom concerned itself with other problems, such as the changes in the geo-political balance of Europe which led Italy into an ambiguous alliance with the German Empire and its historical enemy Austria-Hungary. Only after the victory in the Great War, with the rise of Fascism, would Nice and the old County return fully to the ranks of unredeemed lands still under foreign rule. The defeat in the Second World War almost definitively extinguished the hopes of seeing Nice returned to Italy, but, it is precisely with the Peace Treaty of 1947, which deprived Italy of the Roia Valley with Brig and Tenda, that the conditions to definitively erase the infamous Treaty of Turin from history were born.

In fact, on June 10, 1940, upon Italy's entry into the war, all bilateral treaties signed before that date between Italy (heir to the Kingdom of Sardinia) and France were annulled. The Peace Treaty of Paris was signed on February 10, 1947, which, in Article 44, provided that all powers should communicate to Italy which of the treaties stipulated in the past would remain in force, notifying them however to the UN Secretariat. Among the many treaties that France notified them about, including even the treaty from March 24, 1760 concerning some corrections of the Franco-Savoyard border (in which the Var River is cited as the natural and political border), there is no mention of the Treaty of Turin of 1860 which, according to the text of Article 44 of the 1947 Peace Treaty, was annulled after six months time along with all other non-notified treaties. Therefore, de facto, the French occupation of Savoy and the old County of Nice no longer has any legal bases: it is illegal and illegitimate precisely since March 15, 1948, six months after the Paris Peace Treaty entered into force.

On December 25, 2012, Jean de Pingon (founder of the Savoyan League) announced that the UN Secretariat refused to register the Treaty of Turin, following the document he had presented on March 24, 2010 together with Alain Roullier-Laurens (President of the Nizzard Party and founder of the League for the Restoration of the Rights and Liberties of Nice, LRLN) proving France's failure to register the aforementioned treaty with the United Nations, which therefore meant its definitive repeal. A few months after the publication of the document, the French government declared its intention to submit the Treaty of Turin to the United Nations to register it. On January 8, 2013, in response to a parliamentary question, the government confirmed the UN's refusal to proceed with the registration of the treaty (as announced by Pingon on December 25, 2012), claiming however that it was rejected only because it took place prior to 1945 and therefore would have already been published in several other collections of treaties. The statement is really comical, but even more comical is the French government's claim regarding an alleged “verbal note” supposedly sent to Italy on March 1, 1948 (within the six months stipulated by the 1947 Peace Treaty) concerning their intention to keep the 1860 Treaty of Turin in force. The alleged verbal note would refute the abrogation, but it does not actually exist. Additionally, the contradiction in which the French government has operated and which clearly demonstrates its bad faith must be underlined. If this “verbal note” of March 1, 1948 which sanctioned the validity (and thus registration) of the Treaty of Turin had existed, then what was the need in 2010 to communicate their intention to submit the aforementioned treaty to the United Nations to register it?

The truth is otherwise: the Treaty of Turin of 1860 is definitively abrogated since it was not registered with the United Nations in the terms established by the 1947 Peace Treaty. For this reason it is essential to refuse to consider as valid this treaty which through violence and deception sanctioned the separation of Nice and Savoy from the Kingdom of Sardinia. Notwithstanding a process of Frenchification and cultural genocide carried out for 153 years, Nice and Savoy should once again have the opportunity to express themselves and determine their own future. For its part, Italy should re-establish those cultural, social and commercial relationships with these lands that elevated them to an integral part of Italian national life for centuries.